Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 babb1a18c8bfa75e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.5 KB Created: 2020-12-23 14:48:13 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: a9fb7c41b9c7bce26aaddee02046f262 SHA-1: 48b5e26bc35bb00d1920cf21f0caf8722c2a60b4 SHA-256: babb1a18c8bfa75e64227f35a6264aa4b09dca9573cd30cbe96293adf44a4f40
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple embedded links, with at least one identified as a known malicious redirector. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, a tool sometimes used to create malicious PDFs. The primary attack pattern involves luring users to external, potentially malicious, websites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9996

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/123?utm_term=pitch+in+music In PDF document text
    • https://vodipewelo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637384/5747043.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://riwusivi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/9/134900433/joterometufag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://duzuvopewawufos.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134491429/6507507.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sadoxeliwuduw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134040540/6e07846b35711.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zadisoro.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134525292/fec1ece.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fetagurekejoj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132741571/af25b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zarelusipofox/wozedow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/a8eb9fa7-3d8c-41d8-8c86-864764a5ccb0/jepidu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ecc5895c-8fcd-4e1e-9a54-0b2dbfde3550/64364882301.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bepukuba/27376473691.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kiguteperilodu/lewedozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/geraromu/black_and_decker_finger_sanding_sheets.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2a889cd7-0237-4e26-a8dc-91d00024b086/soulful_simplicity.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/44780873-b406-47a7-99bd-a878a30c25d2/8923572914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e0cbb8d7-06af-45bf-92bd-f7ce00187c30/post_nuptial_agreement_document_minnesota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/vebenok/rijizorovit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000110bc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110BC 5376 bytes
SHA-256: db695a2f09b3408f2c17a9d1aaa954340cf4aee5815e5fecfaec3f347fcad7b6
font_01_sfnt_off0001230e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1230E 4704 bytes
SHA-256: b73fae854d97d2a54378afef456b9a5ffd5108f4dc9b6ee32e26b345bd5b77bb
font_02_sfnt_off000132ee.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x132EE 12000 bytes
SHA-256: 9b8338fbdf2f35eb8ac7d7d38d8ac7f570df4676a67659c8bff2e6b91aa0098c
font_03_sfnt_off00015b8a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15B8A 16124 bytes
SHA-256: d55e2a9b98747035ed34eb63f3077d460ed867a8410aa2e30b7c6b3da07d3377