Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 bab1e3d465b767fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

14.5 KB Created: 1996-10-14 23:33:28 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 15.0300 First seen: 2020-09-15
MD5: 154433e5092243f15b75c082a894ccf7 SHA-1: 0638aa9390398bca952897742d28d25646b6b5ba SHA-256: bab1e3d465b767fb9bd76ea52dee3e3c4af2c4c443d8fe6712f5dfa8ae164084
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The document contains an embedded OLE object, specifically an Equation Editor object, which is flagged as anomalous and indicative of CVE-2018-0798 exploitation. The document body includes a clear 'ENABLE EDITING' prompt, a common lure to bypass macro security. The presence of the OLE object and the lure strongly suggest the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability for initial execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Embedded Equation Editor OLE data contains anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style Equation Editor exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like, but it does not match the exact public matrix-overflow byte signature.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 3584 bytes
SHA-256: 164c2364c3450bef0c8d3e2b2dbf37dfaf906b90a3bac82c56e08625d622d610
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: olE10nATIVE 1360 bytes
SHA-256: e3fb71a2d2c2a10d8e4933836c9b08706af688bf26b131a043ea5442362b6c99