Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba6e3acefb45af2c…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.1 KB
MD5: 7da05a4c9fa6f728752fc29792462058 SHA-1: 6d4d593fad0f2269b0096e5f20da27f2f73fff36 SHA-256: ba6e3acefb45af2c32048d2b3c01b526e326d0fc062fc24badb2b5576c6e621e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE object activation, indicating an attempt to exploit the embedded Equation Editor to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document. No document body text was available for further analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000c8.bin
711e0bcaa5944fa5a940c001f6c0537dced0fdf4009423a77d2d0c1d59898f21
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC8 1810 bytes