Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba69d8c73efc8be8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

43.0 KB Created: 2020-10-05 04:48:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 30ccffcff338a3dbda1e6919c7f78437 SHA-1: f76bbc1f7d6b5313e3537861f4b2852b487e053a SHA-256: ba69d8c73efc8be888ccaf80ea7c8880900fd3e0b8fac4acfdf15ae974bab9c7
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains numerous embedded links, many pointing to disposable hosting and redirecting to a malicious URL. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the embedded links are designed to manipulate search engine results and lure users to potentially harmful content. No scripts were extracted, but the primary attack vector appears to be the malicious redirection links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=all+cheerleaders+must+die+part+2+release+date In PDF document text
    • https://site-1037283.mozfiles.com/files/1037283/razibu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037010.mozfiles.com/files/1037010/91410051791.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037164.mozfiles.com/files/1037164/27603833242.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040280.mozfiles.com/files/1040280/4760217325.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.mtjewelrybox.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874221/godoriwepofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tewov.aatp-mysterygames.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814347/27e981b01ec15.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xafufiwo.saratogatalent.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740003/6534049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kidenagu.ausabletrout.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813855/vejivukol_wuwusuwapoteled_xikubotegimeda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/65bc2bca-4cb8-4439-931d-dce5a42bab44/39895648051.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c745187e-ccb3-4881-abf5-5900c6834baa/jilanelam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/cefe10d6-4d51-4404-a177-e0fc21e48972/bibaketorenofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e7b965ca-939e-42bf-aef0-a7671669a260/koxawimetolagajuxaji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/74846577-0819-4b8d-8ffd-5ab17776f679/baninunagemasopenefixar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6f0c2945-9cc6-4ead-affb-7edb48bdca55/97670957495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/24aeaa23-6d3a-44ee-b70d-5038be573f04/xunamudiwizajijawu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d536b0ee-bfd2-4e28-8cad-bde3c2d1c61d/saguw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006a09.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6A09 5436 bytes
SHA-256: b39ea15c997a7bae082d6168bfbae03e490ee7135af879b6960a598efcd5983f
font_01_sfnt_off00007c5a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7C5A 10224 bytes
SHA-256: 9861de294819c6903334e0eb5058e4792dde3cce7923e32a0cefb05269a61643

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