Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba5238ae90a87a1d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

46.3 KB Created: 2020-10-05 02:25:11 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 30c9952ff5a9636229e75ae6797d639e SHA-1: e45fca7cdf7a3922d2c45ed24fef8685fe760839 SHA-256: ba5238ae90a87a1d7dfff6beb24b7ef13306748723f3cd71915dfa4cbaee9b1a
194 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that lead to a redirector URL, which is part of a link farm designed to distribute malicious content. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains references to 'corel videostudio ultimate x9 crack' and a URL that aligns with the malicious redirector. The presence of a password-protected archive lure heuristic suggests the PDF is intended to trick users into downloading an encrypted payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=corel+videostudio+ultimate+x9+crack In PDF document text
    • https://site-1036955.mozfiles.com/files/1036955/90541830781.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039644.mozfiles.com/files/1039644/mizel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039759.mozfiles.com/files/1039759/51223449286.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043668.mozfiles.com/files/1043668/kowifogufesadetuxif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jameshynes.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739260/jesurepobozegababux.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lavadukul.tidytimeservices.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132680981/5344373.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.opentle.orgIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ebe2caeb-c795-42ab-bed8-51a2f6de2e6c/pegezinabaziluvibobuso.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e80578c8-f5ea-4d28-99a0-8609156beaca/58153164259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/97dcb523-91f1-4d2d-a6a5-e83117a22365/14871868720.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7ba1af39-9010-41f3-8156-51dfcefe4086/sopisodepefature.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e0f415f9-1965-428b-bc91-ca4f4f395968/genekupiwodegugaladan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/94dc73b2-51fd-4f9c-85ea-7b0ac8bfc52b/zevakojipuxunap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5daa9940-c8b8-4da6-b0dd-122ad43e342d/41768783222.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/66cf0267-7986-4215-9a41-6f3670f542d2/17090832600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_004_off00006445.bin decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6445 10480 bytes
SHA-256: 13195e0f45625d3a27179b9c3b0ab0b57319945c65625f87f579988a20cf4ff7
font_00_sfnt_off00005241.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5241 5340 bytes
SHA-256: 8cdeffd9d5b5040fb97eec017f5b6670b2737cedc0ba92a4c7dc400f3e1319ce
font_02_sfnt_off000081fc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x81FC 13252 bytes
SHA-256: d14b31ac3ef3551f17ee9920cd09cc5f9f4911bb93c430b180a2270a9738a1ed

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