Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba327a8472fd320f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.02 MB
MD5: 6c9feaf948626ad9e5284dbcce7554ce SHA-1: d02ce2fcf54e7fb739d3cce730f61dd1691aadd2 SHA-256: ba327a8472fd320f46acca767272d7c0dc4811c69c48b45c867487470a61419b
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically related to CVE-2017-11882, which is a known vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, indicating the file's purpose is to exploit this flaw to deliver a malicious payload. The large amount of hex-encoded data within the OLE object further suggests the presence of an embedded executable.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    RTF contains ~2079KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin
ffb720875365d0cbdcc7a93e0d1449716b80394615f67542b1d5c8896d2cf9a5		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 1044412 bytes

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