Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba2a856a938efc73…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.7 KB
MD5: 4bd162803f33c7d053739ffc6795aa40 SHA-1: af4f227af1684e42ea0e73b08231da6971a4c670 SHA-256: ba2a856a938efc73aca22df09ad27f25ca9f2ee157fbfa260ae71799fa86ecbf
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJAUTLINK` heuristics strongly indicates exploitation of this component. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000b1.bin
28753c6c05905f3ce2852a0ab2e8f3af4aee9dd1cc98df67ea7f5f749ff96716
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1 1575 bytes