Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba282bc3bf981d76…

MALICIOUS

PDF

87.6 KB Created: 2009-01-15 10:20:45 -06:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 8.1.0 (Windows))
MD5: 670647bdfce2046896590a269b84fdbb SHA-1: 174c0f223cfd99cb1e06ad1ecd6b66a895ba723e SHA-256: ba282bc3bf981d769010446b401e71a69d909f04fa9f4ea4eb8c36cd9591dbcb
524 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that triggers a launch action, executing cmd.exe. This command-line interpreter then proceeds to execute a dropped Windows executable, which is disguised as a PDF file named 'sir_vishing.pdf'. The ClamAV detection on the extracted artifact ('Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0') confirms the malicious nature of the payload. The 'SE_MFA_LURE' heuristic suggests the ultimate goal is likely credential harvesting or abuse of multi-factor authentication.

Heuristics 13

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\sir_vishing.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • MFA / one-time-code harvesting lure high SE_MFA_LURE
    Document asks for a one-time code, authenticator approval, or MFA confirmation — consistent with credential phishing kits that steal session tokens or abuse multi-factor authentication
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
sir_vishing.pdf
bf5e304a8d9113ded4872cce4808b3688641708c6199b824075c322fe91ecf94		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 48 at offset 0xADA7 73802 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0049_000.js
f49064b66565c694e5f3e32655e03b78fe8d0040f1ef5657f9892a1c58038056		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 49 at offset 0x159D8 60 bytes
icc_00_off00002604.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2604 3144 bytes

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