Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba22a6b6d0bc1dc2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.3 KB Created: 2020-10-14 23:05:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: b760f0eac7dd94881c60ce0469741c52 SHA-1: 33d85a549de92e0d028bc83e829f9b655346f4f5 SHA-256: ba22a6b6d0bc1dc2579788f87f6d1b659fecae64b0e0cef5f8375cfcae407a0c
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/pify?keyword=windows+10+free+download+for+android+phone In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365660/normal_5f870cb982fc2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366007/normal_5f8704b51c395.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366007/normal_5f86fc2c2ff20.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365553/normal_5f874faf416ce.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://guwomenod.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873843/filosom-lusiwikafese-jerupuxorukoti-novubolifunuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ridolagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775195/8604030.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vuzevarezevarot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130740461/8108700.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sibakixode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814768/xakegagifilixig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039305.mozfiles.com/files/1039305/sozusofe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1044019.mozfiles.com/files/1044019/zobemusuxirumixifuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/fcc4651e-949e-4471-b32e-eda413dfe536/sowodoriwujirota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/520320c8-b3e8-413d-a69c-c025eb0be82b/goseroliz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/ae004632-ef92-4583-802f-05c040edb1b6/xagapedodidipipevakas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/eb0c9a00-2bbc-4837-b717-67958c3deca4/jixemusaxaporegis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/00fbc26c-fb59-4ac3-96dc-df1363a8f97f/58011058340.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006307.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6307 5428 bytes
SHA-256: 74786ed565872e05e83f3c9f92287e399cda90900311d8a321a99bc72cfdad9c
font_01_sfnt_off00007590.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7590 10008 bytes
SHA-256: db8d7459a40c5f12d50c8e7f1728e3779d92cf45bef26437925ad69ed0585ee1

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