Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba0b66a3d177ebd9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.8 KB Created: 2020-08-19 19:06:19 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: e5b8891793f548ff5a4d2be234e9e429 SHA-1: 7c5c45434b2bf4087ade5fb2257dc9d3a4992266 SHA-256: ba0b66a3d177ebd9f8ed0f3eb97da9e1e180eafd267abb61832a0f5b9f2677a2
162 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a heuristic firing for a malicious redirector link pointing to 'https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=files+and+folders+worksheet'. Additionally, a 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' heuristic indicates the document instructs the user to copy/paste content into a shell. This suggests the document's purpose is to trick the user into executing malicious commands, likely to download further malware. The presence of a large number of embedded links, including one to a potentially malicious redirector, supports this. No scripts were extracted from this sample.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=files+and+folders+worksheet
    • http://files.24volt.org/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070009/kitujujepev-sizipa-gemoripis.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/5727/5299/files/leliromupupi.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9628/6119/files/carranza_s_clinical_periodontology_12th_edition_free_download.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9795/6258/files/15174812634.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/4396/3548/files/fizas.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/7781/1867/files/82509332674.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7370/7925/files/61967785640.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/4642/0136/files/zenikesudoweja.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005af5.bin
3e2e88135da87cabbb07125fecac40dcf8e781fb447b10f425262857883f10fa
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5AF5 5104 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006c60.bin
6e0c5e49f2609b6908644e03fd17a91692aeb6a2d95eb2f5259b12da1f975b9e
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C60 10140 bytes