Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 ba09d0f8b0d54ea1…

MALICIOUS

RTF

25.2 KB First seen: 2023-05-02
MD5: dfe1daa92531bdf7c7f6665de38bcbd6 SHA-1: 9b104a913f2c0d01e3f6650491bd9dcd9cd928a7 SHA-256: ba09d0f8b0d54ea16810d59918556d37ffa61ef3eafd234a54444a59ebf37ba8
80 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF file containing embedded OLE objects, indicated by RTF_OBJDATA and RTF_OBJEMB heuristics. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic suggests that these objects are designed to be activated automatically upon opening, which is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities or delivering malicious payloads. The document body is heavily obfuscated and does not provide clear textual lures. No scripts were extracted from this sample. Given the OLE object exploitation, the likely attack pattern is a spearphishing attachment designed to trigger malicious code execution.

Heuristics 3

  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001c52.bin
9fe92eaadb451a78036d6c2a2faabf097bdeeb380285ccc2ad55accac0feb15f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1C52 3661 bytes