Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b9992241904e6341…

MALICIOUS

PDF

68.4 KB Created: 2021-07-16 18:03:00 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 29d639ec38d7ac21ff997e1f16db6c12 SHA-1: fa8ccc1115a5509e0b5f58db67b51da60f1ce0fe SHA-256: b9992241904e6341013b453a6245fcfcba3baa762e686823cba6f5e6302a2080
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file exhibits characteristics of a phishing lure, utilizing an image-based design with a clickable action to redirect users to external URLs. The presence of multiple links pointing to compromised CMS upload directories and disposable hosting suggests an attempt to distribute malicious content or facilitate phishing. ClamAV and ML classifiers also flagged this file as malicious, reinforcing the assessment of its harmful intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9956

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Image-only document with action trigger (screenshot lure) medium PDF_IMAGE_LURE
    PDF has 1 image(s), only 0 text block(s), carries a click-outward action, and is only 68 KB — typical shape of a phishing lure where a full-page screenshot hides a clickable button that launches or submits to an attacker URL.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://halvani.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16085cd257eac0---81928331563.pdf
    • http://herodumpsterrental.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/474fd2d2fae8da961c343f083fbfc2bb/gusimanufepixuri.pdf
    • http://rockfordauburn1966.com/clients/8/85/8549db0cc7d1f63cce07d3be93bd6f3d/File/sewol.pdf
    • http://barrarioservicos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607783c562c12---wefafimowife.pdf
    • https://bluetact.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/50499839787.pdf
    • https://wilsonbarrera.com/inicio/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c9d9e0e602---tawilebilunotifete.pdf
    • http://pm-property.pl/userfiles/file/subawuj.pdf
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/59hj23bo8iph8c8srfd5phtju0/45146163563.pdf
    • http://drapa-technika.cz/UserFiles/File/peraferewugivaj.pdf
    • https://xn--80adj7cxa.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/56a77f50322c1b260409701ba057e9dc/weluvuramukofo.pdf
    • https://www.a2zmedical.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d2aba5967f---6268816564.pdf
    • https://burragebrothers.com/demo/jolie/beta/userfiles/files/86474850521.pdf
    • https://afanasyev-design.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a257d933b1ecf07049a019bce3ff4b0f/nepewovutajodivamul.pdf
    • http://www.colegiometa.net/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b0f55e84fcd---74160115579.pdf
    • http://xn--80akazwaeiw.xn--p1ai/editorfiles/file/bevotevevov.pdf
    • http://www.elitagida.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7s3lslktd8l918jhllevrrceb6/87647726076.pdf
    • https://actaviaserica.org/board/file/files/64675725674.pdf
    • https://lcd96.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0096792ce30f6f35268aaefc57ffcbc9/ragotowexalaxaritu.pdf
    • https://groupunsur1.com/contents//files/fezofe.pdf
    • http://fiorenzuolatrack.it/userfiles/files/xabilefezixusekoxerejaf.pdf
    • https://by-express.com/upfiles/editor/files/zulosakabidap.pdf
    • http://obrienbuilders.com/userfiles/file/22683755943.pdf
    • https://livingcircles.ch/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609cffa600fab---molaxuzudurugirilesakabov.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=eosinophils+12+means
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b28a.bin
3a393e27819fa89594c562a6e197719231629d38ee5f989d6a1817ce05f662e7
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB28A 13852 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000d4fe.bin
e69d841af808c99ef93a675156ea3dda9366510a0e5d8abd7694c88e7636cfc9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD4FE 10472 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000ec8f.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC8F 16792 bytes