Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b98d3b70441e2784…

MALICIOUS

PDF

9.6 KB
MD5: 44ff17362b2182a76d71de0982df615f SHA-1: 984ba9e2456e949f5380afbca0420757dd90f932 SHA-256: b98d3b70441e2784378c2b6b027d9efbbc54907d8266a6055c993a7e2aabb41d
126 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, identified by the PDF_JAVASCRIPT and PDF_JS heuristics. A critical heuristic, CVE_2007_5659, indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability in Adobe Reader using a JavaScript stager embedded within an annotation subject. This stager is responsible for decoding and executing a secondary payload. The presence of deobfuscated JavaScript files further supports the execution of malicious code.

Heuristics 6

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
dc37160715dd481d0bf49e7af5079aad16ed0e66896c1ae05ca27000b3e4454e
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19B 259 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
39ebe7542295c073962d32d0b9c8e6d2d3f7f72165f5d80caccb9f6cc8d52662
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5180 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
42ab3121e35d90588ecd3e8cbd6ae9537be5bcced28faa1a93c5764a9901d6a3
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 43529 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).