Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b97fce0f28efb052…

MALICIOUS

RTF

227.2 KB
MD5: 935a83880e7fde3c12de61af1b835086 SHA-1: 9113a59c4cd8f6a677ffe704ff010d40a7ea5bcf SHA-256: b97fce0f28efb0522a9236ece9fea2af1348157de7466ae457fc0de942d3628f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, with one being automatically linked and triggered for update. This technique is commonly used to execute embedded malicious content, bypassing user interaction for macro execution. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document likely contains instructions to enable content, further supporting its role as a dropper. No specific family could be identified, and no direct IOCs like URLs or hashes were extracted from the embedded objects.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
cc09bb9d1d5f8993d0869c8b4af7c8d576bf660c3fd15ee9fd9e7b2a072e2291
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 19617 bytes
objdata_01_off0000a968.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xA968 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000bf0b.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xBF0B 12297 bytes