Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b977c03190edfdb2…

MALICIOUS

RTF

46.0 KB First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: ea3d73af6191a0239c9c3b0723f8b672 SHA-1: 8bdda0a7fa901afc92291eddb1bc129b015f6a9b SHA-256: b977c03190edfdb21ea4a64556e0158927a9cd7396fe1d7aaa3d3eba17847e26
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that is configured to automatically update and activate. This object utilizes a URL moniker, which is a strong indicator of an attempt to download and execute a secondary payload from the provided obfuscated URL. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_URL_MONIKER_RELATED heuristics confirms this malicious behavior.

Heuristics 4

  • URL Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_URL_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains a URL Moniker GUID in OLE object context, but no decoded remote target was confirmed. Treat as related OLE2Link attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-0199 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000546a.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x546A 11472 bytes
SHA-256: 3518c0b74abb0f00fda2cda9d38c1b6c5798ca0ea77306e9dea07e211083c0bc

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