Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b977212d9ffc6434…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

36.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-19
MD5: 1d99ea58855f95b27262f040b84e14c3 SHA-1: abf835869116015501cc683c1c1c328dc41d7a71 SHA-256: b977212d9ffc64347bc89699c77534009c2c4b057542a995d2e104ebe46f6012
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1059.005 Service Execution

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID and uses \objupdate to force activation, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' to view the content, which is a common technique for malware droppers to bypass security settings.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005142.bin
d2b666f8a8c031b61fcb5e8cde86afb0f571fcc19d639c2b4e6cc35ac1fbec27
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5142 1299 bytes