Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b9514f09040e451e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.4 KB Created: 2020-11-09 04:46:01 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-17
MD5: ec722ccac69e36060555b6761463d4e3 SHA-1: 36da89e51c31529121e3af5af2565f0ed076b594 SHA-256: b9514f09040e451ee80913e1e1b07daab0851f808117a88f5c27da033292c7fb
166 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO poisoning tactic. The heuristic 'SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE' indicates a high likelihood of redirecting users to phishing sites, possibly related to financial information. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the presence of numerous embedded URLs and the ML classification strongly suggest malicious intent to redirect users to potentially harmful content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Payment redirection / bank-detail change lure high SE_PAYMENT_REDIRECT_LURE
    Document describes new or changed bank, wire, ACH, IBAN, SWIFT, or routing instructions — a high-value business-email-compromise pattern
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffset.ru/aws?keyword=using+google+play+apps+on+windows PDF link annotation
    • https://valakafugajebe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134330742/1096441.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://viwezoluzuwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134401695/6336593.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sizukejagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681884/8902364.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bupifepubeweta.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134336259/9050878.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kilejotiwig.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406519/612562.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zulatikuwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776211/zuguxuferufuba_sojuwefu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nowigusoludi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266380/914d0fdeb1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jarapitoxedomel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437170/tebifosekafotuwaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zowerekogag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134672266/nusudatafi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://libadelalisam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134579317/4b4029e8b69d930.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xabogiseduwa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134717421/1779568.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/11587959-093a-4798-93de-c2360c9b34b2/ipod_shuffle_first_generation_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3c581101-829c-4a00-af25-9754526821b8/gothic_lolita_photos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c5fc80c4-a516-479a-91a1-40de4d946fae/baginugowibaromamawoke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006165.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6165 4924 bytes
SHA-256: ad933066891e01e9e151f87f6006e3ec1b2a495db89b1ed9004302c9e4644f4f
font_01_sfnt_off0000723d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x723D 10616 bytes
SHA-256: c83d6173e9eb19aa5e1c86bc3f7ab604f6274bb549ec622a56672afbcaa69983
font_02_sfnt_off0000968f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x968F 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3