Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b94931148a55c469…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

71.7 KB First seen: 2022-06-21
MD5: 80af3afaa92ab3ff88c01aeb2311226f SHA-1: c06c6780ef0995dbca0d65acd5ba93c063adbbcc SHA-256: b94931148a55c469c2f0c4b9a9dcabe5728b0d59401c2f43a3019e3e12341d28
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file is an encrypted Office document, identified as an exploit carrier due to the presence of an Equation Editor OLE object. The critical heuristic 'OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED' indicates a corrupted structure, likely a result of the exploit attempt. The specific heuristic 'CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY' points to a known vulnerability in Equation Editor. The document's encrypted nature prevents direct content analysis, but the combination of heuristics strongly suggests it's designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • CVE-2018-0798 — anomalous Equation Editor native stream high CVE likely CVE_2018_0798_EQUATION_NATIVE_ANOMALY
    Default-encrypted OOXML contains embedded Equation Editor data with anomalous native stream bytes consistent with a CVE-2018-0798-style exploit. This is treated as likely CVE evidence because the Equation object is malformed and payload-like.
  • Encrypted Office package with CFB FAT corruption critical OLE_ENCRYPTED_AND_MALFORMED
    Encrypted-package shape co-occurs with FAT-chain corruption — the documented combined evasion form.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007, AES)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.