Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b916158bfe688ee2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.6 KB Created: 2021-09-18 00:25:50 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 6d0877294ead42a8b394bc83ccf82d6d SHA-1: 63ec7c6bf4ca9bd9018a689195ccfd6eddfe61ea SHA-256: b916158bfe688ee24ed25a44c15b08059a1078ce61836795db6e4f79d98fdb79
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external links, many pointing to compromised or disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or to serve a second-stage payload. The embedded JavaScript is a common vector for exploiting PDF vulnerabilities.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9985

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://crmrealty360degree.in/userfiles/file/41860820605.pdf
    • http://ohmytour.kr/FileData/ckfinder/files/20210907_73C98ECF6B40ACC8.pdf
    • http://allegroescrow.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613fd92f8091d---vizixixipaxokokoni.pdf
    • http://lg-palette.com/upload/files/12422187469.pdf
    • http://ljhalls.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1ffe32f0bf85094d661c6e5f07b58c08/42268870094.pdf
    • http://testplanet.nl/uploads/files/83879758173.pdf
    • http://thevisionkharj.com/userfiles/files/60645829945.pdf
    • http://icsbc.ru/fuploader/file/jakugixujuvefuxujizuzav.pdf
    • https://wasael.com/userfiles/file/zinuwirijuwimezemaremi.pdf
    • https://papiratisk.cz/soubory/10997764976.pdf
    • https://giriconsultancy.com/content_files/files/72301169286.pdf
    • https://www.studioline.ie/ckfinder/userfiles/files/82788006660.pdf
    • http://www.siscard.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140436ecf093---peresuvininusanuxo.pdf
    • http://ipceurope.be/assets/file/2845356472.pdf
    • https://amadesafar.ir/basefile/amadesafarir/files/ralulu.pdf
    • https://almoheetmanpower.com/public_html/userfiles/file/29634597508.pdf
    • https://www.alitec.es/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nugobe.pdf
    • http://www.mueblesgamez.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/36249932165.pdf
    • http://kzlo.pl/fotki/fotki/file/fivepapulegegevuli.pdf
    • http://planet-for-events.de/userfiles/file/zonokesaxiguta.pdf
    • https://mashura.co/userfiles/files/95774372815.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/3vuEKuznOb8/uplcv?utm_term=android+change+default+app+to+open+file
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000df8b.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDF8B 16792 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f7a2.bin
f63c805697a6fe26fb9e2b24da1f2d8d56da8c7220b8e480becc19151753c749
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF7A2 10812 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001104b.bin
d45e38029728c153b1b1648c0f7fb61a9b861989fc913b80fefc006d5f6521f1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1104B 17132 bytes