Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b904a80105f9e9dd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.4 KB Created: 2021-06-21 08:17:28 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 6e5afa034e1dd00ee913b7da2ab09beb SHA-1: e9a4456767b861a0cc76fde20075757adbb0606a SHA-256: b904a80105f9e9dd8fb6240166cbfac3bcf8a093d69d545d8e4c255293cd8664
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a phishing or malware distribution lure. It contains numerous embedded URLs, many pointing to compromised WordPress upload directories, suggesting an attempt to host or distribute malicious files. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the idea that the document is designed to trick users into downloading a payload. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/uplcv?utm_term=free+tamil+movies+download+2020 PDF link annotation
    • https://www.darrellstuckey.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae6215c5603---mizaw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://medgarlci.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7f466c34332cf517b043a311147ade11/47331499881.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://groupkaishan.com/d/files/kudelete.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiolauramoschini.it/userfiles/files/34830276439.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://3duct.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b90215ab10---99651573601.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sk-developers.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b8995c4e45c---fotalokafinisiwirerijiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.pointcookelectrician.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16076059f8dbaf---17342641491.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://efnnma.org/files/file/18873926453.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tort-art.ru/userfiles/file/xidoribizefewuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://yuktiedu.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5827d09568820bb1d1032a14333c0fea/befanak.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.yoursurveysurveyors.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a451a34ea03---gigolavijagom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://petroblend.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b6622e7c21---runugovuxaro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mikepromedia.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8uet4dq60brb82l3prlsf27ur2/sogej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608ecb1d69057---rizakinukemamezuvigexu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bridalchapel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160861d7bbf716---babopalu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://globalclassic.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/r676a9g3vkf60r2skv7gljtfd0/2055159539.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f18a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF18A 5352 bytes
SHA-256: 7204327a5d1e7fe12b29f47c67de9a5a6e0e3f962184a5c0bb0fc1dae6300b7e
font_01_sfnt_off000103b9.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x103B9 10808 bytes
SHA-256: 277e2a270a5792f2244c6e98770f6c7f5f6fa05338cc347c48b44a582b849a58

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