Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b8caa10560480f61…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.0 KB Created: 2020-07-08 11:28:51 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a79c134054f188376e07c814a66aad66 SHA-1: 85de9fe0f02093a5be6f6250fbd1721727730cdc SHA-256: b8caa10560480f61b19e1bb0f76f46548c494bcdd953270b7ded1fdfa459bd02
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, specifically linking to known malicious redirector infrastructure and employing a link farm for SEO manipulation. The document body, though partially corrupted, contains a URL that appears to be part of this lure. The primary attack pattern involves tricking the user into downloading a file via a deceptive link, likely leading to further malware or phishing. No scripts were extracted, limiting the analysis of the execution chain.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=group%204%20syllabus%20pdf%20download
    • http://files.centrocha.org/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873870/7918256.pdf
    • http://files.annagalatirealtor.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776718/979473.pdf
    • http://files.s-mays.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969046/zamesexupe_visowuxo_velakajujubo_sirorefumugi.pdf
    • http://files.betsykroon.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738758/faxib_jidujuxukofu_vovelajod_fujor.pdf
    • http://files.withoutbordersshop.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132710575/d9be58fe2f658b1.pdf
    • http://files.caltempmissionb.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409055/bawixe.pdf
    • http://files.jettiethissen.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070488/917363.pdf
    • http://files.foodloveblog.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380868/vosirijofa.pdf
    • http://files.mathtalks.net/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637325/ginaderugodupi_dolububoj_zijupe.pdf
    • https://merefipo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/5405725988.pdf
    • https://fadadidigar.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/virazatiliwibinugomewaw.pdf
    • https://kozaxijewob.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xufosepixefubete.pdf
    • https://gonokerobe.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/23502027979.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007b50.bin
2f2f94928ac6129811deb5afd0a5be5d90d38d45e99f89fdf539ee66769dd344
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7B50 5124 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00008cdc.bin
0712048a4bdffbd5cf7e363c6489a4f845e2a188a53179f57053e3b94e4d82dc
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8CDC 10120 bytes