Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b89f6eec24473d46…

MALICIOUS

PDF

84.9 KB Created: 2021-06-27 04:42:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 618d675282e391cae91439aa4a2b6a5c SHA-1: d266405b43a9224fd03408cb869a900f52a11040 SHA-256: b89f6eec24473d46d4254d0a587916133968065237be0fc003c516993a29b71d
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. The presence of a 'Password-protected archive handoff' heuristic suggests the document is designed to trick users into downloading an encrypted file, likely to bypass security scans. The numerous external URLs, many pointing to compromised CMS upload directories or disposable hosting, serve as a link farm to facilitate this payload delivery. No scripts were extracted, but the overall pattern points to a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9846

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://smidgel.ru/uplcv?utm_term=isometric+drawing+is
    • http://domeinbeverdonk.be/assets/files/file/73300534015.pdf
    • https://www.elementstraining.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/tl1kjh1clddggo54a1o2a120p3/bemigenodunomavozuwedeta.pdf
    • http://www.europesolidaire.eu/userfiles/files/jonamamusikipukisitusomo.pdf
    • https://advancedcheckcashadvance.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606fbee5b85b0---80454337704.pdf
    • https://www.lavishlook.se/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3da39a973db6969fbf828b5a590797ed/rezesufidifasez.pdf
    • http://www.photobreak.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac4dd3c6e34---54603813056.pdf
    • https://muzeumkonstancina.pl/attachments/file/vujofosigizozogo.pdf
    • https://akita-inu.lv/www/files/files/6099198601.pdf
    • https://www.clubmanizales.com.co/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f4d73634a6---jolivumasekibujaxejamelo.pdf
    • https://www.adelaarenergy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mdhkb8gq10gve812mkvqaajk8q/vetobumuxukadiwesesux.pdf
    • https://www.keystonecare.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9521461cde56671fd1f5ba14033c4de8/sofixukomazo.pdf
    • http://www.theflightfest.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c4c7e100936---kopapexawam.pdf
    • http://kolkandkolkdesign.com/site/data/ws/files/sozupanivejosobaz.pdf
    • http://hoondb.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075e21107e30---vakenedajugufos.pdf
    • https://fortlauderdale-carservice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160807aa0c2d1d---dimatelejesawejebopen.pdf
    • http://www.mvdisposal.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607784e725aed---deribokunorobatugekokabi.pdf
    • https://duext.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c370f15d3bdc30e9f8567d3b9d79a99d/34845781310.pdf
    • https://ahi.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5102c79ff3fb4532b896d24b5d0e9f1d/jusufavisimitixizi.pdf
    • http://helderlive.nl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/firap.pdf
    • https://skyfireconsulting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/og04k0g4s68lqgl5sck9ffgbpq/39453221609.pdf
    • https://certifiedmoversinc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/4a9635a107b8c330c1db720efb5a908c/senezovir.pdf
    • http://principessavencanice.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b753c74c377---35627264850.pdf
    • http://hibertek.com/image/files/20210625_095913.pdf
    • http://www.odnpoznan.pl/fotki/file/file/30564905949.pdf
    • https://insights3.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/011a24e0809ebbf125597ebad5d64dd5/kimaxoboxemamifafabi.pdf
    • http://www.goldenlantern.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c937493c215---77777763751.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e229.bin
9b0bd5667aab3d45a5acd305c6c709198b3f75da042d665e4adaea40d0db20d5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE229 20016 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00011419.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11419 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off00012c30.bin
228dd9de0f8cb2bad1024e85111322b8fe0cc5a1d2d1d45fd22119cddc262429
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12C30 10704 bytes