Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b8830973112f3952…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.6 KB Created: 2021-02-17 04:21:43 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: e5f32b4c5c0c197c92a43af2a13cc423 SHA-1: e10bc536e512d3fa34b2d0a6be1d9dcb8c59da45 SHA-256: b8830973112f3952fab77cb3e98d7faa37c6843628f17b307469fe886ae7eca3
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links pointing to other PDFs hosted on various domains, many of which appear to be disposable or disposable-like. This behavior is characteristic of a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or conduct phishing. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature, indicating it is likely a phishing or trojan delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://jacksth.ru/strik?utm_term=literary+devices+definitions+worksheet PDF link annotation
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4459482/normal_5ff0698dce400.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/duwokarewesu/iaJTxhi/9739385665.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tagekoworiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134016686/1185154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sawitofi/iMidhaq/52927531275.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://static.s123-cdn-static.com/uploads/4456391/normal_6005300e6fcff.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4377931/normal_60127d73c5fb9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fokatekox/HELehaj/us_football_prediction_site.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bunofavaluz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134661637/2572733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://betixisu.22web.org/marketing_2018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/labifikup/0YNibgE/fezimasugumilugiwunolud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dorubirema.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134317311/1c291ce34.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/kugorazig/2pihkie/pen_and_paper_rpg_for_2_players.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/fudikuzi/zicpiyk/rabiworunovuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://xasezujagabef.epizy.com/fazigipibegefixebezo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fosoxubap.epizy.com/concour_castor_informatique_maths.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/dujepav/80172472523.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/pusixa/9591714165.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f878.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF878 5336 bytes
SHA-256: 631742c160ba1a1c0d15c2e7f187fa29767e1d140bb0187ad9de4526577f8706
font_01_sfnt_off00010abe.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10ABE 11528 bytes
SHA-256: de82dd66f81c56ad3ed5226873b703b2a30cc41e8fe12bdf0d51c6244579d8dc

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