Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b87d3f8957a90fb9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

174.4 KB Created: 2001-12-14 14:26:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 9.0
MD5: 10bb7e5541195d632464423ec213fe29 SHA-1: 4dba938b5eb946c9bf8ad15c192ec50a20c3dd27 SHA-256: b87d3f8957a90fb9c0c323b6fbb40c8eeda7b5bd1bf279b16aa98fb405759f88
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The sample exhibits characteristics of a malicious Office document, including a high OLE slack anomaly and references to Windows API functions like VirtualAlloc, LoadLibrary, and GetProcAddress. These API calls suggest the document is designed to load and execute arbitrary code, likely a second-stage payload. No specific document body content or scripts were extracted to further detail the attack, leading to an 'unknown family' classification and moderate confidence.

Heuristics 4

  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 178,624 bytes but its declared streams total only 94,801 bytes — 83,823 bytes (47%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Reference to VirtualAlloc API medium SC_STR_VIRTUALALLOC
    Reference to VirtualAlloc API

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