Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b868ddd7ecc5a05a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.10 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: d64b0a020b3127e70ce8a7d826f784d3 SHA-1: e3858efdaa07908e6309fc28bf5c7e2e11026d69 SHA-256: b868ddd7ecc5a05adde8a0823574792f172095e217c87bab227f9cbcba13f9c8
150 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1204 User Execution

The sample exploits CVE-2017-0199, a known vulnerability for remote code execution, indicated by the 'OLE_VBA_MACROS' and 'CVE_2017_0199' heuristic firings. The embedded URL 'https://ljg.cl/dtts?&villa=knotty&metallurgist=majestic&pull=enthusiastic&gobbler=frightened&lisa=jittery&crate' is likely used to download a secondary payload. The 'SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE' heuristic suggests the document's content is designed to trick users into falling for an advance-fee fraud. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious static findings further supports a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Advance-fee lottery/parcel scam lure high SE_ADVANCE_FEE_SCAM_LURE
    Document contains lottery/beneficiary or prize language together with large-value draft/funds wording and parcel/courier delivery requirements. This is a classic advance-fee fraud document shape.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 1 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005e000.pdf
6575f297b7534e77f04297c60a9016d0750b727e8895759e861754b9d9dc43ac		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5E000 773120 bytes

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