Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b8250976f3ba2328…

MALICIOUS

PDF

42.6 KB Created: 2020-08-28 14:41:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fb1aef48cccb16e373e5193d06278de4 SHA-1: c0fc7a2606fce3b48e49f62aac42f99d847635af SHA-256: b8250976f3ba2328c185ebbaed61f09b8df217ef23219167c9db879ddaf8fdc4
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a high number of embedded links, many pointing to shopify.com, but one critical link redirects to a known malicious domain (ttraff.com). The document also includes a heuristic indicating it's a password-protected archive lure, suggesting the user is expected to download an encrypted file. The presence of the malicious redirector and the link farm indicates a likely attempt to deliver a secondary payload.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=variable+or+field+declared+void+ardu
    • http://files.mycdaclass.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130738524/bexavuwukepawo.pdf
    • http://kirujizod.onesimplereality.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131407945/buzaluzofudenijigu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7900/7398/files/xiwumupinu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/8935/3117/files/78634162504.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/5684/0350/files/amadeus_flight_information_command.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9586/8067/files/28999144736.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0448/1276/3298/files/d_d_wolf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/9350/7739/files/buxutazej.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5271/9515/files/72143932041.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/8697/6926/files/wapozofafotov.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/1701/7243/files/steps_in_business_planning_process.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/6956/3290/files/rewevexudijetogabenetux.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000604e.bin
285aae9ea2466f6a4cdcc9d8137f4e80662377e2bb5af25a7f86022770910e3a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x604E 5004 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00007161.bin
8d9bbf6fbbb5f5e5945494fb3ef6f52ec90000090b25e98546fe1517bc038602		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7161 14076 bytes

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