Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b80ae947b3d17cfb…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.3 KB
MD5: eeb0c557c2a47647816b3dd96bfb9aed SHA-1: 0fba76b1ffe103583276f6766147a8a0e80941f6 SHA-256: b80ae947b3d17cfbea8e868e2ff1026d0cc27e939be778fe339f635a86ea8a0f
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.002 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit targeting CVE-2017-11882. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED heuristics strongly indicates this vulnerability is being leveraged. The objupdate directive further confirms that the embedded object is intended to be activated, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000087.bin
ef01f75eb2777a2ebb133618efb11b1eb2fdd92c4a76b78db03fc4ebd3b921c3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x87 1512 bytes