Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b7e6e9d6842a27a7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

79.5 KB Created: 2021-04-29 07:35:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 31660f6ff562c5f44a970d80e6fdc3fd SHA-1: a024c9382fe52121a2a35ae713a107e08713e1c5 SHA-256: b7e6e9d6842a27a7a37c401ac171483729965196efec957c7544f044d17b9c64
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

This OOXML document contains a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening. The macro utilizes WScript.Shell to execute commands, indicating a likely downloader or initial execution stage for further malicious activity. The presence of a Document_Open macro and WScript.Shell usage are strong indicators of malicious intent.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
66b99dbe9f961f46de08562fe6ba3f77352dd2ff92a64d0ab540cfeea06cf0f4		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 10100 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
1c4ea7342ff28928074d5e37bc1b9be27b1786d5b8767200bd6c6485c7301aa6		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36352 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.