Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b7cf7b07aba6a055…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.0 KB Created: 2020-12-22 00:55:08 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: c2100b55ba275e87f4d388b8d3d7b434 SHA-1: bdc3a7ecc951d8feda9729aaf226ba803889c445 SHA-256: b7cf7b07aba6a05590c51b404d955bf2a41a3cf7665eb2f84fbfa2c3c67ab771
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains like weebly.com, suggesting a link farm or phishing operation. The presence of a ClamAV detection for 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' and a high ML score further support its malicious nature. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a search query related to yard maintenance, which is likely a lure to direct users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafffi.ru/strik?utm_term=fixing+holes+in+yard+from+dog PDF link annotation
    • https://judadumoxa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134718892/6743414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rilebowiteb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133986594/zokatejefudiz-tapavadazajo-lelumipakut-gopufulaki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sivipafegedijog.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134443607/dikivogumi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kenuvibugitevam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134700053/jelululabogejubij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rowiteruna.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134470704/eab12c79b98.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rezomiwutamanap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134362688/1e252.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zirufifun.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874679/vunexikok_disanipisovafam_zowobu_tusipemix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nunebavakagepas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446468/4a7b1622e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rakamukomegu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681656/ladefubit-tafojapumepokan-vowupe-zidedix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mozesewopizudal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134363743/bamofelap_zamoxuzovo_bazisoma_waliviririg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimejomukokije.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134510045/fanako.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/02a0a2bd-b899-4056-a99b-335564289f95/71471344917.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/sazariwapa/29451429888.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/60d8b6f7-e2f3-4430-b23f-2ccb652abe03/gavuvafevinagen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000bd32.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xBD32 5444 bytes
SHA-256: 4d3f237b93bd4a824fda31f5fc6ed7d8a1078f639c4bbd548e836d3b30e593e2
font_01_sfnt_off0000cfa5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCFA5 9300 bytes
SHA-256: 5794675355406121b8ed9782b9be98bbd97a3d2fadc57f87611645df1df5c7a0