Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b7c8e5e93911d69d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

19.6 KB Created: 2008-02-28 13:59:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2020-09-24
MD5: 82ebb3796477bf05fa1ea1e6e69d570b SHA-1: 5c86e4c8a64fbb8e389fa07a27e0ead2bf66789a SHA-256: b7c8e5e93911d69d19428da7a15d826654463afacfd80dac2d4465a0978fa15a
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The OOXML document contains an embedded OLE object with indicators for dropping an executable payload, suggesting exploitation of CVE-2026-21514. The embedded object also contains a URL, http://www.teamvirus.net, which is likely used to download a secondary stage payload. The presence of an embedded executable within an OLE object strongly indicates a malicious intent to execute code upon opening.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Payload URL recovered from embedded OLE object (1 URL) info OOXML_EMBEDDED_OBJECT_URL
    An embedded OLE object (xl/word/ppt embeddings) carries a next-stage download URL in its Ole10Native/Package stream — stored literally (incl. UTF-16) or base64-encoded — which the package-level URL sweep does not see. Surfaced as an IOC; self-validating (only real payload hosts).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.teamvirus.net In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 19968 bytes
SHA-256: c6743421e7f7f8d7afba1aa178e4990e08e4d207b94a6f06481b9e0bdd613921
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 16772 bytes
SHA-256: ccf1900924cab227f379e6e8cb453871eb232bbd2f488f21b37309783aa2ff8c

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.