Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b7a4104f0a28992a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

82.4 KB Created: 2021-06-26 10:47:59 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-14
MD5: 168d08e44641b0037b3b3d10bdf27bca SHA-1: 3449e0bb075b1eea9effc4b12ef2dc15a700935b SHA-256: b7a4104f0a28992ac32453c5c751642758e39e25d163b063efcb8ef96680ee99
116 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document exhibits characteristics of a callback phishing or tech-support scam, as indicated by the 'SE_CALLBACK_LURE' heuristic. It contains numerous links to potentially compromised WordPress upload storage and disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to host malicious content or redirect users. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded links point towards an attack pattern designed to deceive users into initiating contact, likely for credential harvesting or financial fraud.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9992

Heuristics 6

  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://jtipartner.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/27810072190.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://estidevelopers.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7b52a6fb221cf79e8c6a8c3a6e1ece76/22762526909.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iideree.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16087b5d701887---tavukamutu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zbraneklapka.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34515493259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://argra.rs/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c273dd6279f---vovidujasaxomep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ivepe-elearning.gr/assets/UserFiles/mainHome/file/woxemipofusuxipes.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://contact-house.com/fckeditor/upload/file/6869586874.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vivekanandbawwa.com/userfiles/file/32078095056.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saftanton.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16095bd14e9777---86577677478.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://barrarioservicos.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160828acba20a4---wimulusa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anhuifan.com/upload_fck/file/2021-4-29/20210429002812499031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.miamiairportlimo.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d619b890721---40821933376.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://librojuridico.com/aym_images/files/15660863308.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://china-zzld.com/uploadfile/file///2021061716104210.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://clarksville.net/wysiwygfiles/file/goxiruw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alternativefitness.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b392b146314---75869834558.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://webhostmurah.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091863b6e757---zaxeniboxunekojudasuzefi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vernadoc.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/320eba1fa30a8cac01f2a89a5137d3d6/ritarafipirifiporudiwaziv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://averon.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bdd47812609---62260585991.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=axis+bank+rtgs+form+pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://bxthirteen.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a46192e473d909cdfd010565dfa49f49/garasasurupujevulajata.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e00d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE00D 16828 bytes
SHA-256: 68e317d4aee476243a9eef4997a404435064974d338d6fd29f660b28017fe137
font_01_sfnt_off00010be7.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10BE7 10980 bytes
SHA-256: 500e56acd18bd5e871b353d428efc29c4070dd036a7d34011979c9de741a4ee4
font_02_sfnt_off0001250c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1250C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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