Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b7780556ebe4a1e0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

130.2 KB Created: 2021-06-26 03:24:48 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: cdd3daacde3e96cf8a1bad31f837acb9 SHA-1: 085d0c1d6d84597eff6d974ca75a441ea5032c41 SHA-256: b7780556ebe4a1e0ed2776d5f34a173f51dd5f596039aee33b3a01482313b649
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample contains embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for executing malicious code within PDFs. It also exhibits characteristics of a link farm, with numerous URLs pointing to potentially compromised or disposable hosting, suggesting an attempt to redirect users to malicious sites. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier further support its malicious nature, likely as a phishing or malware delivery mechanism.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9932

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.kzhep.in.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mea98cqiiq6gnutr6lp78omum1/rafiluguvumidiroxokajedur.pdf
    • https://sg-design.top/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/023829d0fbdead79b590ec4ab7c737a2/82916899274.pdf
    • https://monarchwinemerchants.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8882e4638ce0429f6721024d15de9687/80650802428.pdf
    • http://fonnepal.org/userfiles/file/xugevapuku.pdf
    • http://medica-eg.com/userfiles/file/metakiru.pdf
    • http://julieesteban.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16091ac54b24a9---fujopafolepiveru.pdf
    • http://megat.pl/uploaded/fck_files/file/63022256998.pdf
    • http://xn--80aab8aioy.xn--p1ai/userfiles/file/furegolusorazubikot.pdf
    • https://rittenhousesmiles.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dfc14bdc90768192d6d672072a0e4f2e/lubemite.pdf
    • https://www.formwork.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fpva99jheud47ffdp3epjl3ju7/36440438246.pdf
    • http://www.sunarmisir.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6doebd3ne0tqsiq9nc2ojq5734/80640137096.pdf
    • https://bataretak.com/img/files/file/lovapaxoju.pdf
    • https://schmitz.cz/res/file/zefonewuvokuvetunonugo.pdf
    • https://maclashoes.it/file/62331826554.pdf
    • https://chamsocmuihong.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3r2tp8uf5jp1fv6e1ov35nh6b0/xutani.pdf
    • http://dom-nenilovo.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/b1427b8237f1cff5235e58b4daccaebf/34751003549.pdf
    • http://atdawnwelift.com/userfiles/file/98199939706.pdf
    • https://corumosmanlimakina.com/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/seselawuzajep.pdf
    • http://www.kmclogistics.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/477d426b03655b6a4e275698d9fe52c0/20999411430.pdf
    • http://russia-ex.com/xenimubetepi.pdf
    • http://trainternational.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098faff234bd---25207095824.pdf
    • http://dirabrealtors.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b0e3a46b63---49662127342.pdf
    • https://butterfly-propertymanagement.com/userfiles/file/vakonuvosurilegaterozevi.pdf
    • https://kicksomeglass.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/252017688cc0c83ee8f606ecfe2a14af/37501517241.pdf
    • https://xn----9sbccjdbca7cyaieg1a3j.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/3b8f5ddb0cf1e877586df15e86ced68d/vonipov.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=st+gregory+church
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00019c6a.bin
171a93056b13da331decd821112e31e55bb91789e9196053c255da6159190661
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x19C6A 10228 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0001b392.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B392 16792 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0001cba4.bin
bf9976cfaac5b90011194728404c971cb5a793a44aad9332ed9386117a19ecca
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1CBA4 18704 bytes