Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b76a8465d9280dcd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

95.2 KB Created: 2021-08-12 08:21:44 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-23
MD5: ba7508e8b7bcb47be4bc49f9537b8b21 SHA-1: d1bc32a513cf372c8a5f4e12f17c5cde6219bfcb SHA-256: b76a8465d9280dcdcf049503ae590f09048689bbd51c9abcc719b4770a10514b
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF document uses a cloud document lure, impersonating services like Google Drive, to trick users into clicking on embedded links. Several heuristics indicate these links point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, with one high-severity heuristic specifically flagging a PDF link to an algorithmically-generated URL. ClamAV detection as 'Pdf.Phishing.Trojan' further supports the malicious nature of this file, suggesting it's designed to deliver a phishing payload or malware.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9855

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://allytemp.ru/uplcv?utm_term=google+drive+root+folder+id PDF link annotation
    • https://intelean.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609338d1683b1---37494534904.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tikatalog.sk/_files/file/xoruxukevazasofufom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aeskulap24h.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2fe0ddfbb7---bikabalunimobinisepe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ncdesign.it/userfiles/files/fafexeku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://living-stone.lu/userfiles/files/60039900207.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://frontiersneurophotonics.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/16089022f79f6a---73748640737.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dedanskecasinoer.dk/userfiles/file/94453628508.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quaint-house.com/images/blog//file/28595719964.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hum-lucknow.org/test/fckeditor/file/podabakenuzujerutelofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://e68momo.com/shopadmin/upload/files/62273462241.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ineke-ott.nl/keramiek-beelden-imagesfile/67509686049.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.tai.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081cd8ab1969---33287124125.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://brianhaymore.com/images/e/file/zinogo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://teplitsyoptom.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/65c764a954c159ad95d770089e199bf6/25380393738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://serramentisiciliano.it/userfiles/files/julagufejowabebikuwojeze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://higher-reason.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/625o1rimv9naou3hdlquiidhsc/suxuguduwunaxegilutijid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mimpishio2.net/contents//files/nerurubodigogekap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sciencevier.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a1a246d5791---95883119040.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thehideawayresortpattaya.com/userfiles/files/41322345463.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7d74uhc7quoilij8ecfnb9q8j6/25421072271.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shreyaghoshal.com/konadnew/userfiles/file/98741818744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thehawthornnyc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093f33992ad3---sawujor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ferado.vn/userfiles/file/38730569196.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://beadsandsupplies.com/images/file/mefidulo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wumag.pl/userfiles/file/bezojaxigu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://suleymanporoy.com/img/userfiles/files/48073012495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://celcg.pl/uploaded/file/36108994293.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ceramkgres.ru/userfiles/file/43350518573.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off000110a8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110A8 10200 bytes
SHA-256: df0877d52638639cf4d28dd026dd5cd6e206449513226780dd775367f8683da4
font_01_sfnt_off00012774.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12774 17080 bytes
SHA-256: 01206f0d747912ee367b2ba485b4f2efadc19c1aceb2ba77c11a082595e31cdb
font_02_sfnt_off00015408.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x15408 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.