Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b757d907f7747cec…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

147.8 KB Created: 2022-06-24 13:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2022-06-24
MD5: adf42fe7a5cca355819fd61cf7b5332c SHA-1: 6dc19d2a729fd4b592203577df08be4b83efb008 SHA-256: b757d907f7747cec5f190f7e89deacf4fabb62f873e6d7078fc8cec78ac03f86
84 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Auto-Run Components

The file is a malicious OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object. Heuristics indicate that this OLE package is designed to drop an auto-executable payload, specifically identified as a JAR file. The embedded OLE object and the dropped payload are the primary indicators of malicious activity.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
72fbf0d71a42ac21c502bf1b1d28ac1cff95bc32f968ef915a621482a23e5cde		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 122880 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.95, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
c6d22c77b5f3d50100ff9bf2cd45ce066e8cb5e70ab5142515fa2ce51202b6e3		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 118995 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
emf_00.emf
77f530befb771f3c2d58b995013b529337f69ae38b3d5ad6f9b2c3edbe48197b		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5460 bytes

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