Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b751d28097f637d6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

872.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-22
MD5: 12aaa2b6ec495c030203948c42858571 SHA-1: ae76cae012a9185de5a2101039076bf427b9e936 SHA-256: b751d28097f637d6cd142ff6f3fd32cc446a586e7f194da932e09db9d22b816f
114 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability in OLE2Link to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, http://192.210.175.4/receipt_232/2/0oO0O0O0O0Oo0o000O0O0O0O0O000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23O0o0o0O0o0o0OO0o0o0000O000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.dOC, is highly suspicious and likely serves as the initial download point for a secondary payload. Although no VBA code was found to be executable, the presence of embedded objects and the CVE exploit strongly suggest a downloader or dropper functionality.

Heuristics 6

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.210.175.4/receipt_232/2/0oO0O0O0O0Oo0o000O0O0O0O0O000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23O0o0o0O0o0o0OO0o0o0000O000%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%2300000000000.dOC
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0004b400.pdf
c0e3c08276fe5b2430856aaa3b4fe817159290206024ec52a2d99c10997db021		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x4B400 585216 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
8dfe5b0cd1c36474a5f74781380744f31dc5f358a01625c9d63d466359798d7d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 889344 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
c54d6f432518632bbac972db9f9bed864119e295990aca4ff7a3fbe3d2cb6d8d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 868352 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00074600.pdf
5fcdb93c4cb58d9e054f986dcb57e0e648d536b1b2108032bbc4932698136f9d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x74600 416768 bytes

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