Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b750bfba9ac3c3e5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

78.2 KB Created: 2021-06-09 22:19:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-11
MD5: 52392735cd99e12d38abbe26f3ca71a4 SHA-1: b90b7f14460b188713dee9f32ffb0986561aceca SHA-256: b750bfba9ac3c3e52da7d8d0279e2691a4c519fe37a0b780f3f0862fae302d59
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

The file is a malicious PDF detected by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous links to compromised WordPress sites, suggesting it's part of a link farm designed to host malicious content. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the idea that this PDF is intended to trick users into downloading a secondary payload, likely exploiting a PDF vulnerability for execution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://medvor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=h600+pairing+utility PDF link annotation
    • http://www.peopleoftheheath.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ab79fca551d---13949850748.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://inchiriereelicopterromania.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b566426b494---13993885350.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kraljicabih.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b421b6d8633---18678073583.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.formwork.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/g576dkf9odbbaim63rd3o98kqf/xilezobe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.yoursurveysurveyors.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609bd9cca8969---tusewidojofekugov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://asigurareingermania.ro/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lgmrm11mp22t6ui939da26bate/nabegovezemeralikox.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.amiunaorchestra.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160982c36b3360---73478947608.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://az4group.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cb886c33f7---92662263755.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://condominiovillage.com/userfiles/file/93216816733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://extremetour74.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9cc7f239cdeb6af2c1fc1f07a6032f52/luzolij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.vivelamusica.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a6abfd1780f---fakavavevuroxalikubokeje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://minhvuongthuphap.com/upload/ck/files/wilokekewigalokadufewew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://topopentertainment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac41ed5dca5---3607788960.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://centrobrands.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d77c22602fcb1113fb129afe1ccc44e1/laxobasaguwanunigib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://az4group.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160983fa414838---bedorofoti.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thegroverestaurantnj.com/userfiles/files/85933075941.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aguiapromocional.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609edf606906a---ganedo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.qookspot.kitchen/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac7a937ca4b---xixowozogago.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e58f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE58F 4820 bytes
SHA-256: 1f862969fef349564b1e68d87dceddba0fce1e644f048d907489a6246e09768e
font_01_sfnt_off0000f5ef.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5EF 11632 bytes
SHA-256: a58157019ef006f7f7a8b05c78aa2f180755fd5d9dc0a0ea25641d456b2774a4
font_02_sfnt_off00011d94.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11D94 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ce7e2e230a41ba6fc2d7d2240890c8289d67876d84a3d076d67c0b48111c8230

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