Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b74e022504c86796…

MALICIOUS

PDF

54.8 KB Created: 2020-07-27 19:14:58 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: c90a110c781970692c260c49fc05a64f SHA-1: bf806df85a93ef982c446447b8ed08ec34f96320 SHA-256: b74e022504c8679654c04faddfd7fc6564f650022bb919aa8e5cbab70d47b4ad
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a mass external link farm, with one prominent link leading to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains text that appears to be a lure for 'Android studio run release apk'. The heuristic 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' strongly suggests the intent is to trick users into revealing recovery secrets or private keys. The primary malicious IOC is the redirector URL, which likely leads to a phishing or credential harvesting page.

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/pify?keyword=android+studio+run+release+apk
    • http://files.wfut.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696330/wufixanim-novebazu.pdf
    • http://files.suelacy.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814050/47e9f4d.pdf
    • http://files.wanderlustironworks.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438071/4024ae25dc12.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/0159/3505/files/58856118380.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/4040/6684/files/47869580705.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/7178/9470/files/tumixujapegotu.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/3151/8622/files/10202313212.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7567/4024/files/82557954060.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/0464/9884/files/37506527515.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0439/8091/4846/files/kariwofomobelogar.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/52665001447.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0436/3495/0304/files/safobijaf.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/0580/4698/files/86834919162.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0427/9438/5575/files/47047128755.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/0505/0021/files/divewunidoveva.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00009aac.bin
a223952326984cf25575d7bae92efd0da3889b15af0be4a129e56776c5bb7fc5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9AAC 4888 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000ab4f.bin
1ecd2d3294c51b6e8e66bcbda3fda659c1f623988c30b5a387680dbaf42db5e2
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAB4F 10164 bytes