Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b74d9134d8f26ec2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

50.9 KB Created: 2020-10-15 23:34:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-26
MD5: 318be7ba4906e06123da85c7347b23bd SHA-1: 07d8e834451e3f3c1eed32b75b52697c766dcdbb SHA-256: b74d9134d8f26ec2eb93e75db8363da75688addd71715cc6fcb91ef6325f1070
224 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links, including one to a known malicious redirector, suggesting it's part of a link farm designed to lead users to malicious content. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates the document likely instructs the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass initial security scans. The ML classifier strongly flags this PDF as malicious, supporting the conclusion that it's a lure for a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/pify?keyword=nfc+card+reader+android+example In PDF document text
    • https://site-1040095.mozfiles.com/files/1040095/wamenoju.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1040259.mozfiles.com/files/1040259/digegud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043408.mozfiles.com/files/1043408/42328915959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1038494.mozfiles.com/files/1038494/63280854263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1039804.mozfiles.com/files/1039804/zazurej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kasukironumasex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454791/3728284.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xonimitofowe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682232/wepixixifob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sibakixode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814768/nofezokepafepilufusi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d2a90870-7101-4431-af02-a4ef42d26c61/fivumoxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e39c5e1e-f33d-42d4-bf5b-631b15fa4353/pabanuleg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/5ae0f668-a4da-4918-8326-a9e47bf619f3/88159235733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/43e58f76-f85d-49f5-bec2-72fc92bf83ce/32644211280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6a3aa969-232e-46b0-89e6-3ac23cb87d44/39237013363.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1ad9d101-c0ba-45aa-a72c-a1b69dbef2f9/4452135290.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/abc66ab0-053f-41db-96d8-7d7cb1659960/70556609261.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/21507309-a170-45d4-bdf0-da2b4666135c/bavapamubidofotej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/94a00d9d-0f85-4206-abf2-30d1f9aaaebd/tirojupoxijetimakax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2ec983a1-3fac-4647-836d-1503a767111d/5631071171.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3b68706b-cdbf-4c49-853b-3968da89355c/54134912586.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/bd4ba110-7694-472e-a738-88bf527aaec7/porowopig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/01e81ac8-952b-478f-a7ad-c91fcb8d0e22/tupemuvudepor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/db409c37-5707-40be-ae09-3f7aff6e954e/lewumawukusem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000890d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x890D 5160 bytes
SHA-256: 4e673dae12b33183c0432066eaa8cf53120daecfa6a5908fd030b4378e540f31
font_01_sfnt_off00009a7f.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9A7F 10424 bytes
SHA-256: 776fc4c6ae3d7e4182fbf40c74dc86d40f10611b3c3559f70fd323172fa9a23d

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