RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · b734458704e0b15a

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: 6fa08ff23bec0624d65be6dc25d52734 SHA-1: 12b0caf0169bbde3db96866ef9d9764d1175ac51 SHA-256: b734458704e0b15a59dd0911ca693b0b0b73bcff265c165a4ec8e707739fd2aa

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object embeddings and auto-linking features, with explicit instructions to enable content. This strongly suggests a lure to bypass macro security and execute embedded malicious code. The specific OLE object activation techniques indicate an attempt to download and run a secondary payload, though no specific family can be identified from the available heuristics.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `c4f480dcd0a623a4394a1b2b4f93f72fec4f1ab61f5031d6d0b2a0c655f60738`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79780 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `d733e4a9adea8215e4f8dbc9f010ad931f002d5eafb8219bc16de7c780d01454`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79753 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9b3.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9B3	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f56.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F56	12297 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.