Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b728c0d432c34705…

MALICIOUS

PDF

79.2 KB Created: 2021-01-08 14:37:15 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-11-03
MD5: 0ba8676e6ce167680cc28e07d59dc72b SHA-1: ee52c27dbb23a9bd79a1978d2a993bcd48141831 SHA-256: b728c0d432c34705af6c18bbf1acae9019c81aa2f2f5fd39ec97c6f44845a87a
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous external links, many hosted on disposable domains, suggesting a link farm or SEO spam operation. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware distribution. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URLs are indicative of techniques used to redirect users to malicious sites.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffnew.ru/aws?utm_term=java+tutorial+videos+for+beginners+free PDF link annotation
    • https://zovakobazala.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131456363/1891494.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nugekepujipa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318644/4504225.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vojitimene.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134596684/5486314.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wipibafupegivu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134868488/jusodo_xubamapujaz_lusasevoxubige.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gifenatewa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134480542/rezivodamoneworikotu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gogiwujuduk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134352159/1235064.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tiketutowiko.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/5/3/135345961/kiniluxodalixosi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://terulupi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406892/muxone.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kidubaviputotej.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134520398/sekori-tuvam-suxijikeluxamon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://siwizapetodid.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134041585/1bfeec9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mokowevabib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739664/52ffd39f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/70cdb4ea-7209-4061-9609-3b5803cbd1d1/66258738832.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gapivegek/transformari_metri_cubi_in_litri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0698f980-203c-4837-ab41-a7c68eae59c2/15750650507.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f81d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF81D 5264 bytes
SHA-256: 5be274e86963a1767fbf83fbb688d52fb5a0ff6333ad0ea2474a57b3af6779f6
font_01_sfnt_off00010a18.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10A18 11224 bytes
SHA-256: 9d1f4de3e8bfed8c7b88414e764c306961db4b55dbf4db09c83251f374c9ed39

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