Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b70884922656090f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.68 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: e937209295393667fd039f88d3737748 SHA-1: 9d139d17bc1d689e5a221d9c0f6c0264e9f83517 SHA-256: b70884922656090fbb58658f7048df4d8a19b355ed5b7742816a52e258701e0d
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The critical heuristic firing for CVE_2017_0199 indicates that the OLE2Link object is configured to use a URL moniker to load a remote resource. The embedded URL, https://kutt.rhaimes.com/RKXawA, is highly suspicious and likely serves as a loader for a second-stage payload. The presence of a secondary embedded PDF with suspicious static findings further supports the malicious nature of this document.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_014_off0003f52b.bin
b0a7e7055d5b66edffe76c7b1f32ec80318d696df6181f1536f27aa69517872f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x3F52B 566620 bytes
stream_015_off0006f1fe.bin
0d5715bfb4def94d644e408c5ed714ea2ac557b061d036e7fdcf0a2bf1c990e2		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x6F1FE 398152 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000882ce.bin
ff37b045be3591e8cfbfa76f5dec51bee78deccafa1dc391d1edb36502c7f815		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x882CE 346068 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off000b0600.pdf
a685b7c466eff5cddf7af843744df4dcea9259a54f5d7b4b2d36ea8a3f59b051		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xB0600 1036288 bytes

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