Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b6eba1919922ce3e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

923.0 KB Created: 2006-12-22 13:27:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-12-24
MD5: ef7ecf1e50df20607e8d948af7286e26 SHA-1: f0c02b86d8288007ce4a4ef4d627ce33e367b909 SHA-256: b6eba1919922ce3e5f66fb924ae5620c0d6779a9c72362abd227611051033260
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is a malicious Microsoft Word document exploiting CVE-2007-3899 to execute arbitrary code. It contains an embedded PE executable and instructs the user to run a file named "Weihnachtskarte.exe", likely a second-stage payload. The document body is a lure for executing this embedded payload, suggesting a spearphishing attachment attack vector.

Heuristics 9

  • CVE-2007-3899 — Microsoft Word malformed string memory corruption critical CVE likely CVE_2007_3899
    Word OLE document has the MS07-060 malformed-string exploit shape: a Word 97-family FIB points to a malformed DOP/string-table region with an abnormal INT_MAX run, inflated text counters, and exploit payload or Mdropper.Z campaign evidence.
  • OLE with Ole10Native — possible CVE-2026-21514 exploitation high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Document contains a Word OLE object with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. CVE-2026-21514 exploits OLE metadata validation; this stronger structure is treated as likely exploitation.
  • Embedded PE executable critical OLE_EMBEDDED_EXE
    MZ/PE header found inside document — possible embedded executable
  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.mclintock.co.uk In document text (OLE body)
    • http://www.jacquielawson.comIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/bibliographyIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/customXmlIn document text (OLE body)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_office_00006074.exe embedded-pe Office MZ+PE at offset 0x6074 920460 bytes
SHA-256: eeb0f5f8f5d793aea8c2ab0aeb7bf8be9105d9689c3b3e48792d61938a3bfe08
ole10native_00.bin ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1164517010/Ole10Native 909793 bytes
SHA-256: 787690610b3dbc4249d82c14a532c8a5a445871f832a17443386207dc754db55

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