Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b6cfbccb11f896f4…

MALICIOUS

RTF

16.8 KB First seen: 2023-02-19
MD5: 2ecf0ef101b480a10dc3c6c46e17eeb1 SHA-1: c867b6bb6fae9bbc790f2a90f76f8036944f3e5d SHA-256: b6cfbccb11f896f464d542f8ad058c714b375021eec87a2238cdfdb6f99a1d7e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This technique is commonly used to achieve arbitrary code execution, typically to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001fe6.bin
85083e78e173fd749b5f57ea9964814330dbdbf7247be15cdbb480fb9197b245
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FE6 1960 bytes