Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b6b6dfd5c9240eb0…

MALICIOUS

PDF

10.5 KB Created: 2010-08-29 16:19:36 Authoring application: styeZek colSnap
MD5: ffe35cc5427e3ae2edfa6d36acc65532 SHA-1: 5835763b39e4e1aff1aeb558348a4b4f62eed5d7 SHA-256: b6b6dfd5c9240eb03df4d172afc1b034308609ac25fa2b55195796be128267fa
96 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical ClamAV detection 'Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81' strongly indicates a malicious PDF exploit. The presence of embedded files and a PDF embedded script payload further supports this. The script appears to be obfuscated, but its structure suggests it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body contains JavaScript-like code that attempts to reconstruct strings, likely for obfuscation.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Dropped-81
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/1.0/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xtd/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xfdf/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-form/2.8/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0006.bin
d81baa73e490e4cb879e13927cacd1dd1be37524a37eac51603e15117c578777
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 6 at offset 0x213 84 bytes
embedded_file_obj0007.bin
24c130f03a4cf51d470b536e94c1e58af67665739e200e0ce198ad41086243c0
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 7 at offset 0x2B1 228 bytes
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
4f7b7ce31e747f4ea90beffb5b605c41ce46d3027a92f656d9f38f2ec5c42ad5
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0x3E0 1101 bytes
embedded_file_obj0009.bin
c97e0522381d6196cc0695f35f4d065f15c9c86a9601a7f776c6afd3f4c6b460
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 9 at offset 0x877 199 bytes
embedded_file_obj0010.bin
5f52e7803f686e369b4f02fd57b450adad0c1d644cede285ff556ab5ecadde56
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 10 at offset 0x98A 6668 bytes
embedded_file_obj0011.bin
e6c26a3478346d27e841ad49868ebf68bf4c6863b6750e8d60bda3c4c6f79876
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 11 at offset 0x23E0 77 bytes
embedded_file_obj0012.bin
92a3ce61d783e15932b5de127ce45a9b4c2f98f4da2453f65241573c1dda808a
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 12 at offset 0x2477 56 bytes