RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · b6a7cb49d7be8704

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.85 MB

MD5: 7c0ac63cf2e1099e05dbb5c3b9b18050 SHA-1: 6d4ea9f1c7a2b4eadefc32f86fd30217320550ef SHA-256: b6a7cb49d7be87043584fa415359964f96d151d86d6cf42100e46b52fa904cd4

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability (RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR). The presence of large hex data blocks within the OLE object (RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX) and the ".objupdate" directive (RTF_OBJUPDATE) strongly suggest that the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to execute a secondary payload. The large size of the embedded object further supports the likelihood of a packed or obfuscated payload being hidden within. No document body text was available for analysis, but the heuristics clearly indicate a malicious exploit delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 6

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1934KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000945.bin` `a0ee48d6b68dd45a6505f650762152c5949938a9748701ec1eefa832b6f6f963`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x945	967426 bytes
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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