Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 b6a60553e2052d52…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

53.9 KB
MD5: 829ca6387e35f02b44f2340e68adef59 SHA-1: d582ecf73656e8148dd1ce7b5a206eccf24b1227 SHA-256: b6a60553e2052d5263ed22173152842a95c53626de8cba618e112b7c891576b7
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link

The sample is an RTF document containing OLE object data and specifically triggers critical heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded OLE object is forced to activate, which is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities like the one in Equation Editor. This suggests the document is designed to exploit a known vulnerability to gain initial execution, likely for a subsequent payload download.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000009bf.bin
ff66aac8748c788315e4305a73f89bc71b51ada12a03a619e72ce24d5d19007b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9BF 1933 bytes